Following on from my post on 2 July, I had another newspaper piece in the Australian Financial Review (today, Tuesday 15 July), called: “GOAL! A Better Alternative to Penalty Shootouts“. The link is gated as usual (see p.43 of the hard copy if you have it, or e-mail me a request). It further delineates the economic case for shifting the penalty shoot-out to before extra-time.
My work on the Brazil myth and a general description of my research profile is in the newspapers again. This time, discussed in this piece by Peter Martin: “Can Soccernomics Save the Socceroos?“, which appeared in The Sunday Age two days ago (15 June). The online version is linked (p.35 in hard copy).
UPDATE: Brazil held to a goalless draw in the second match of group phase by none other than their bogey-team, México (as indicated in my earlier Australian Financial Review piece)! How, you may ask? The myth tells us that México not scoring early circumvented having Brazil run up a cricket score against them – hats off to the insightful tactics of master coach, Miguel Herrera.
My piece: “Economics Lends Little Support to the Socceroos” appeared in today’s Australian Financial Review (Thursday 12 June). Link gated; but it is on p.43 of the hard copy if you have access to that. I draw an analogy between the optimal tactics for beating Brazil at the World Cup and upstaging a larger business rival in industry.
The abstract of the original 2012 journal article from Applied Economics Letters on which it is based can be found here.
UPDATE: Brazil wins the tournament opener 3-1 after Croatia failed to heed the myth and opened the scoring on 11′ (albeit through an own-goal). By admission, while on paper it looks like a substantiation of the myth, on the balance of play it was anything but!
[Cross-posted at: Football Perspectives, 25 September 2012]
Last Wednesday in Goiânia, Brazil defeated arch-nemesis Argentina 2-1 in a friendly match to square the all-time head-to-head ledger between the two giants of CONMEBOL at 35 wins apiece from their 94 meetings dating back to 1914.
This was much to my chagrin, as my in-laws are Argentine. Could it be that Juan Manuel Martínez’s sublime 20th minute opener (after a 12 successive-pass move) was a clear tactical mistake, insofar that it ‘awoke the sleeping giant’?
Brazil, urged on by the 40,000-strong fanatical home crowd, attacked furiously from the re-start and equalised only six minutes later, and eventually won by the odd goal in three with a Neymar penalty at the death.
Realistically, any rational individual would have to think that the answer is a resounding ‘no’ – after all, why would any professional footballer deliberately spurn the opportunity to score a goal when they have the chance? However, while doing this would appear to be totally irrational on face value, an old ‘myth’ about Brazil in football – if believed – would provide such a reason.
Formally, the myth that it is that when playing against Brazil, it is unwise tactically to score early in the game. The intuition here is that scoring early merely serves to make the Brazilian eleven angry, providing them with extra incentive to attack furiously and score repeatedly for the remainder of the game, thus handing a football ‘lesson’ to the opposition who dared to go 1-0 up earlier.
As can be imagined, the myth probably owes its existence to a small number of identifiable (and famous) cases where this chain of competitive behaviours played out. In the final of the 1958 World Cup, hosts Sweden went ahead after four minutes, only to have Brazil open the floodgates thereafter; winning 5-2 (and a brace from 17-year old Pelé). Four years later in Santiago, the sense of déjà vu was palpable in the final, when Czechoslovakia scored on 15 minutes, with Brazil equalising two minutes later and winning 3-1. There have also been numerous other such instances.
While it may seem at first to be a frivolous exercise in sports science, it is nevertheless a useful applied microeconomic analogy to a specific (but common) industrial setting. Namely, a finite-length bilateral (but asymmetric) industry contest, in which substantiation of the myth would provide evidence that an underdog over-exerts effort (relative to optimal) early in the contest against a more favoured opponent, and that analogously the favourite under-exerts effort early. Such a conclusion would refute the theoretical findings (that the underdog has an incentive to commit effort early) of Baik and Shogren’s seminal 1992 piece in American Economic Review, and is (kind of) more consistent with Avinash Dixit’s earlier 1987 paper (where the ordering of moves is not endogenised), also in AER.
What does the data tell us?
For the prospective opponent that takes heed of the myth, perhaps the optimal implied strategy is to keep the game at 0-0 until the final few minutes and then score, circumventing Brazil’s scope to react. A casual look at the data suggests that there may be something to this – of Brazil’s 306 ‘A’ international matches since 8 August 1993 (when FIFA rankings were published), Brazil has lost 40 (in regulation time), of which 15 produced a 0-1 score line, and in a disproportionate six out of these 15, the opponent scored the winner in the final 10 minutes (this compares to only four out of Brazil’s 37 victories by 1-0 coming via a goal after the 80th minute), and meanwhile there have been 26 scoreless draws.
One still believed the myth to be an empirical issue. Using a sample of these matches, I set out to compare (only) Brazil’s scoring outcomes, after various ‘early’ cut-offs of 15, 25 and 35 minutes, in a treatment group of matches in which they concede an early goal, to a control group in which the opponent does not score early. On the basis of mean scoring rates (goals divided by minutes played), Brazil scored more frequently after the early cut-offs in the control games, significantly so for the latter cut-offs, in direct contrast to the myth.
Controlling for match-specific factors
However, the comparison of scoring rates did not account for various important match-specific factors that could be driving the results. When ordered probit models were estimated to control for these factors, the point estimate of the treatment game dummy variable became positive – the correct sign required for the myth to hold (except for the 35-minute minute cut-off) – but was insignificant. Here, factors such as home-ground advantage, competitive balance of the teams (according to FIFA ranks) and context of the match (friendly, qualifier, group/knock-out stage of tournament), all became important.
Finally, matches in which Brazil themselves score early before the opponent were removed from the sample, so as to make a cleaner comparison of whether the opponent is either at 0-0 at the early cut-off or 1-0 at/before it. Here, the dummy variable of interest (for the 25-minute cut-off) actually became very close to substantiating the myth, with a p-value close to 10%.
However, the hypothesis was framed in such a way to give the myth ‘every possible chance’ to hold, hence the ruling was that the myth is, to phrase television’s Adam Savage and Jamie Hyneman, ‘totally busted’!
Baik, K. H. and Shogren, J. F. (1992), “Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment”, American Economic Review, 82 (1), 359-362.
Dixit, A. (1987), “Strategic Behavior in Contests”, American Economic Review, 77 (5), 891-898.
Lenten, L. J. A. (2012), “The Underdog Should Always Fire the First Salvo against Brazil“, Applied Economics Letters, 19 (10), 935-938.
I recently recorded a video (description below) that follows from a previous post on 16 July 2010.
FIFA President Sepp Blatter called penalty shootouts in football (soccer) a “tragedy”. Dr Jan Libich interviews me about our study (also co-authored by Dr Petr Stehlik) assessing an alternative rule: to stage the penalty shootout BEFORE (rather than after) extra-time. The study can be downloaded at www.janlibich.com/penalties.pdf. This video was recorded on 31 August 2012.
[Archived from: The Sports Economist, 23 January 2012]
The new NFL overtime rule, see page 111 (introduced last season for playoff games only) finally became binding in the current playoff series two weeks ago, and then for a second time yesterday. Of most interest to economists about the rule change is its potential for teams to alter their overtime strategies in response to the element of the rule that both teams are now guaranteed a direct opportunity to score.
While it’s far too early to make firm inferences about this, it’s worth recounting that the primary intention of the rule was for the result of the coin toss determining which team gets to receive the kick-off (and consequently first possession) to have less power in determining the match winner (previously almost 60% of the nearly 500 overtime games since 1974). At the margin, we might also expect touchdowns to be the winning method of scoring slightly more often than previously, since it is now the only way that the team with first possession can effectively kill the game without the opposition getting the chance to equalize.
On the basis of these first two observations, it is interesting to note that the qualitative outcomes were very different – while winning the toss allowed Denver and Tim Tebow to end the contest on the first play via a touchdown, both NY Giants and San Fransisco each failed to score on their first possession, triggering reversion to sudden death as previously, which was won eventually by the former. [Disclaimer: I have only recently followed the sport, so feel free to critique this via comments.]
While this (admittedly premature) anecdotal evidence suggests that the coin toss is more influential than before, the reality is about as mixed as could have been expected. Someday – perhaps in a few decades or even within the decade should the rule be extended to the regular season, one of our esteemed TSE colleagues will no doubt crunch the numbers on this rule change when there is a sufficient (presuming due restraint exercised) sample size.
[Archived from: The Sports Economist, 30 November 2011]
The International Rugby Board (IRB) report on the analysis of match statistics from the 2011 World Cup was released recently (see the report here). It paints a flattering picture of various game specifics in comparison to the 2007 and 2003 World Cups, including competitive balance (see my earlier post on this issue):
…Tier 2 teams were competitive for all 80 minutes of the game. The Tier 1 teams did not pull away over the last 20 minutes which was frequently the case in previous World Cups.
…fewer set pieces, a substantial reduction in kicks from hand and many more passes, Rugby World Cup 2011 saw a renewed emphasis on running rugby.
On the latter, Bret Harris from The Australian newspaper (1 December) is not convinced, citing (perhaps unknowingly) what economists would refer to as selection biases (insofar that the sample of World Cup matches are, on average, less competitively balanced than the population of professional matches):
What was that? Running rugby? If the World Cup was a festival of running rugby, then I’m missing something. Certainly, there were some big scores when the super powers of the Tri-Nations and the Six Nations played the minnows, but in the crucial pool matches and the knockout stages, teams played not to lose rather than to win. There was not a lot of expansive, attacking rugby when the top-tier teams played each other.
For rugby fans, be advised to read the report and make your own decision. My feeling was that the 2011 World Cup (overall) was a marginal improvement on 2007 in terms of attacking/attractive Rugby.